Salsbery v. Ritter by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
2-15-1957
Salsbery v. Ritter
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Salsbery v. Ritter 48 Cal.2d 1 (1957).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/782
REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
(48 C.2d 1; S06 P.2d 89'7) 
[L. A. No. 24012. In Bank. Feb. 15, 1957.] 
WINSTON N. SALSBERY et a!., Appellants, v. TEX 
RITTER et a1., Respondents. 
{L. A. No. 24013. In Bank. Feb. 15, 1957.] 
WINSTON W. SALSBERY et a!., Appellants, v. TEX 
RITTER et at, Defendants; EUGENE W. BISCAILUZ, 
as SherUi, etc., et a1., Respondents. ' 
[1] Judgments - Declaratory Judgments - Plea.ding.-Generally, 
when a complaint for declaratory relief shows the existence of I 
an actual controversy among the parties a general demurrer, 
should be overruled, and plaintiff is entitled to a declaration 
of his rights whether or not the declaration is favorable to· 
him. 
[2] Id.-Declaratory Judgments-When Remedy May Be Invoked. 
-Although the remedy against a sheriff for failure to issue a 
certificate of redemption to either plaintiffs or their subsequent 
judgment creditors might nppropriately be a petition for man-
date, an action for declaratory relief is not inappr,opriate 
[1} See Cal.Jur.2d, Declaratory Relief, § 32 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Declaratory Judgments, § 63 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 12; [2] Judgments, 
§9(3); [3,18J Executions, §83; [4,5) Process, §8; [6) Execu-
tions, § 76; [7) Executions, § 76; Homesteads, § 63; [8, 13-16] Exe-
cutions, § 79; [9] Exerlltions, §§ 75, 79 (2); [10, 12] Executions, 
§79(2); (l1J Ban~tqJtcy, § 9; [17] Executions, § 79(1). 
( 1 ) 
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where a controversy with respect to redemptions revolves 
around the meaning of Code Civ. Proe., § 703, requiring re-
cordation of notice of redemption. 
[3] Executions-Redemption-Actions-Pleading.-As against a 
general demurrer, a complaint for declaration of rights based 
on a sheriff's failure to issue a certificate of redemption to 
either plaintiffs or their subsequent judgment creditors may 
be construed as an application for mandate. 
[4] Process-Issuance of Summons-Alias Summons.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 406, providing for issuance of only one original sum-
mons for each county in which one of the defendants resides, 
and § 408, providing that an alias lIummonll may issue when 
the original has been returned or lost, contemplate that there 
is to be outstanding in a single county only one summons at a 
time. 
[6] ld. - Issuance of Summons - Alias SummoDB.-Service of a 
second alias summons without the return of the first alias sum-
mons or an affidavit that the first had been lost does not 
warrant annulment of a default judgment when the attack 
eomes in an independent suit in equity more than a year after 
entry of the judgment and plaintiffs do not allege that they 
had a meritorious defense to the original action. 
[Sa, 6b] Executions-Redemption-Who May Redeem-Oreditors 
of Judgment Debtor.-Judgment creditors who obtained a 
judgment against the debtor subsequent to an execution sale 
of the debtor's realty under a different judgment are entitled 
to redeem such realty since, on recordation of their judgment, 
it became a lien on the interest the debtor retained. 
[7] ld.-Redemption: Homesteads - Antecedent Liens and Lia-
bilities.-The fact that a judgment debtor against whom cred-
itors obtained a judgment subsequent to an execution sale of 
realty under a different judgment homesteaded the property 
before the junior creditors' redemption did not render the 
redemption invalid as a forced sale of exempt property, since 
under Civ. Code, § 1241, the homestead was subject to sale in ' 
satisfaction of a judgment that constituted a lien on the 
premises before the declaration of homestead was filed. 
[8] ld.-Redemption - Procedure - Redemption From PreviOus 
Redemptioner.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 703, declaring that 
if property sold at an execution sale be redeemed by a re-
demptioner, "another redemptioner may, within sixty days 
after the last redemption, again redeem it from the last re-
demptioner on paying the sum paid on such last redemption, 
[4] See CaLJur.· Process, Notices and Papers, § 9; Am.Jur., 
Process, § 9. ,-/ 
[6] See OaL.fur.id, Executions, 1206; Am..Jur. ExeeutioDII, 
t 862 eh8CJ. I 
) 
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• • . and, in addition, the amount of any liens held by such 
redemptioner prior to his own with interest," the statutory 
words "such redemptioner" refer to the words "last redemp-
tioner," which refer not to the current redemptioner but to the 
prior redemptioner, and as thus interpreted the latter part of 
the quotation would read "and, in addition, the amount of 
any lien held by the prior redemptioner prior to his own . • ."; 
and "liens . . . prior to his own" means liens prior to the lien 
on which the current redemptioner seeks to redeem. 
[9] ld.-Redemption-Purpose and Construction of Statute.-One 
primary purpose of statutory redemption is to force the pur-
chaser at an execution sale to bid the property in at a priee 
approximating its fair value, and to effectuate such purpose 
the statute must be construed to encourage redemption and 
make the property answer for existing liens up to its value; 
redemption would not be encouraged by a construction that 
would permit a subsequent lienor to re-redeem without paying 
to the prior redemptioner the amount of his judgment. 
no ld. - Redemption - Procedure - Pa)'ment - Amount.-Un-
der Code Civ. Proc., § 702, providing that on redemption from 
the execution purchaser the redemptioner must pay the pur-
chase price and certain other items "and if the purchaser be 
also a creditor, having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, 
other than the judgment under which said purchase was made, 
the amount of such lien with interest," the liens "that must be 
paid are those prior to that on which the current redemptioner 
seeks to redeem, and the rule mnst be the same on redemption 
from a prior redemptioner. 
[11] Bankruptcy-meet of Filing Petition.-Mere filing of peti-
tions in bankruptcy do not serve to discharge a judgment. 
[12] Executions-Redemption-Procedure to Obtain-Payment-
Amount.-Where a judgment obtained by judgment creditors 
subsequent to an execution sale of the debtor's realty under 
a different judgment was recorded before the debtor filed a 
petition in bankruptcy, the judgment lien was unaffected by 
the bankruptcy proceedings, and a discharge of the judgment 
in bankruptcy would not reduce the amount required for ~­
demption, since Code eiv. Proc., § 703, relating to the measure 
of payment due a prior redemptioner, requires payment of 
liens, not judgments. 
[18] ld. - Redemption - Notice of Redemption - Recordation.-
Code Civ. Proc., § 703, refers to two distinct notices, a notice 
of redemption and a notice of subsequent expenditures or 
after-acquired liens, and the requirement that a notice of re-
demption be filed _ with the county recorder is applicable 
Whether or not the:'redemptioner, subsequent to his redemption, 
makes expenditures for- items enumerated in the section or 
acquires another lien. 
I 
I 
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[14] Id. - Redemption - Notice of Subsequent Expenditures or 
After·acquired Liens.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 703, relating 
to notices of redemption and of subsequent expenditures or 
after-acquired liens and specifically providing that "if such 
notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without pay-
ing such tax, assessment, sum or lien," the reference to "tax, 
assessment, sum, or lien" indicates that the specified penalty 
pertains only to failure to record a notice of subsequent ex-
penditures or after-acquired liens, not to failure to record a 
notice of redemption. 
[15] Id. - Redemption - Notice of Redemption - Recordation.-
Reasons underlying the statutory requirement that a notice of 
redemption be recorded (Code Civ. Proc., § 703) are that such 
notice diminishes the possibility that a subsequent redemp-
tioner will make payment to some person who because of an 
undisclosed intervening redemption no longer has any interest 
in the property, and that persons eligible to re-redeem are en-
titled to know the amount of money required to effect a 
redemption so that they may act intelligently with respect 
to the property, and notice of redemption gives notice of the 
amount of lien on which a prior redemption was made. 
[16] Id.-Redemption-Notice of Redemption-Effect of Failure 
to Record.-The effect of a failure to record the notice of re-
demption required by Code Civ. Proc., § 703, depends on events 
following the omission; if no person sought to re-redeem within 
the statutory period, the failure to record would have no effect, 
but if a subsequent redemptioner should, without notice, pay 
the wrong person, the good-faith redemption would be effective 
as against the faulty one. 
[17] Id.-Redemption-Procedure to Obtain-Payment-Tender.-
When a person eligible to redeem property sold at an execu-
tion sale, without notice of any intervening redemption, tenders 
to the sheriff or the last redemptioner of record a sum of 
money which but for the lien of the undisclosed redemptioner 
would be sufficient to effect a redemption, the tender is suffi-
cient, and the intervening redemptioner who failed to record 
is precluded from demanding as a prerequisite to redemption 
from him the amount of his lien unless the person seeking to 
redeem is notified of the pertinent facts by the sheriff or the 
last redemptioner of record. 
[18] Id. - Redemption - Actions - Pleading. - In an action for 
declaratory relief based on a sheriff's failure to issue a certifi-
cate of redemption, plaintiffs, whose property was sold on 
execution, must show that they had no actual notice of a prior 
redemption w)lcn they tendered a sum of money which but 
for the lien of the undisclosed redemptioner would be sufficient 
to effect a redemption, before they will be entitled to a favor-
able declaration, but without an allegation pleading such fact 
) 
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the complaint is sufficient where it states a ease for a declara-
tion of the meaning of Code Civ. Proe., § 703, requiring 
recordation of notice of redemption. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Bayard Rhone, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action for declaratory and other relief. Judgments of dis-
missal affirmed as to defendants Municipal Court of the Los 
Angeles Judicial District and its clerk; reversed as to other 
defendants. 
Edward H. Blixt for Appellants. 
Stanley Sevilla, in pro. per., Kenneth D. Holland, Harold 
W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and William E. 
Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 20, 1955, plaintiffs filed an 
amended complaint consisting of three counts in which they 
sought (1) a declaration of rights, (2) a determination of 
conflicting claims to realty, and (3) the nullification of a 
judgment and an execution sale of realty pursuant thereto. 
On June 29, defendants Biscailuz, sheriff of Los Angeles 
County; the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial 
District; and Barbour, clerk of the municipal court, filed a 
demurrer attacking each count of the amended complaint as 
insufficient to state a cause of action. The court sustained 
the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment 
of dismissal for those defendants. 
On September 19, after plaintiffs had filed a fourth amended 
complaint, defendants Ritter and Holland filed a demurrer, 
and a separate demurrer was filed by defendants Custom 
Craft, Cutright, Nishemine, and Sevilla. Each of these de-
murrers was upon the ground that the fourth amended com~ 
plaint failed to state a cause of action. Both demurrers were 
sustained without leave to amend, and judgment of dismissal 
was also entered for those defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. 
'1.'he ultimate issue on appeal is whether or not the facts 
alleged by plaintiffs show a right to relief. The fourth 
amended complaint is identical to the amended complaint 
insofar as defendjUi1.s Barbour, Biscailuz, and the municipal 
court are concerned, and since the count for declaratory 
6 SALSBERY 1.1. RITTER [48 C.2d 
relief contains substantially all of the allegations found in 
the other counts, only that count will be discussed. 
In substance these are the facts alleged: Defendant Custom 
Craft obtained a judgment against plaintiffs, Winston and 
Helen Salsbery, for $150.09 and costs. In the action an 
original summons was issued and returned. An alias sum-
mons was issued, and without the return of the first alias 
summons or an affidavit that it had been lost, a second alias 
summons was issued by the Clerk. While the first alias sum-
mons was still outstanding, service of the second alias summons 
was made upon Helen, and judgment was entered by default.1 
Pursuant to the Custom Craft judgment a writ of execu-
tion issued and was levied upon the interests of plaintiffs 
in certain described realty. On May 4, 1954, the sheriff sold 
plaintiffs' interests to defendants Cutright, Nishemine, and 
Sevilla for $51.70 and issued and recorded a certificate of sale. 
On June 14, 1954, defendants Ritter and Holland obtained 
a judgment against plaintiffs for $1,500,2 which was recorded 
June 25, 1954. 
On April 21, 1955, plaintiffs homesteaded their interest 
in the realty. 
On April 28, 1955, defendants Ritter and Holland pur-
ported to redeem the property by paying to the sheriff $51.70 
plus interest and costs. Ritter and Holland did not record 
a notice of redemption as required by section 703 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
On April 29, 1955, plaintiffs served upon the sheriff a 
notice of redemption, filed a copy of the notice with the 
county recorder, and deposited with the sheriff $61.80, which 
is still on deposit with him. The sheriff, Ritter, and Holland 
have demanded that plaintiffs deposit with the sheriff an 
additional sum equal to the amount of the judgment in favor 
of Ritter and Holland, plus interest and costs. The sheriff 
refuses to issue a certificate of redemption to either plaintiffs 
or Ritter and Holland on the ground that he does not know 
who is legally entitled to the certificate. 
On June 1, 1955, plaintiffs filed " .•• two petitions in 
bankruptcy • • . discharging all of the aforementioned judg-
ments and indebtedness." 
'The faet that the ;judgment was taken by default is not alleged in 
the eomplaint but is i1selosed by plaintiffs' petition. This defieienc1 
eould have been eureO: b1 amendment. 
'Holland is Bitter's attorney, and he vigorously diselaims &Dy pel"llonal 
,utereat in this judgment. This point, however, is not properll railed 
.,. • ...-.l t.aurrer to tile complaint, 
) 
) 
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[1] In an action for declaratory relief, when the com-
plaint shows the existence of an actual controversy among 
the parties, a general demurrer to the complaint should be 
oY('rruled. The plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of his 
rights whether the declaration is favorable to him or not. 
(Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. ([; Loan Soc., 23 Ca1.2d 719, 728 
et seq. [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062].) Two exceptions 
to this general rule have been recognized (Bennett v. Hibernia 
Bank, 47 Ca1.2d 540, 549-550 [305 P.2d 20]), but neither 
exception is involved in this case. 
It is readily apparent that the complaint shows the exist-
ence of an actual controversy between plaintiffs and de-
fendants Custom Craft, Cutright, Nishemine, and Sevilla 
with respect to the validity of the Custom Craft judgment 
and the subsequent execution sale. Likewise, a controversy 
is shown to exist between plaintiffs and defendants Ritter 
and Holland with respect to rights arising from the two 
purported redemptions. [2] Although the remedy against the 
sheriff might appropriately be a petition for mandate (see 
Lawler v. Gleason, 130 Ca1.App.2d 390 [279 P.2d 70]), an 
action for declaratory relief is not inappropriate, since the 
controversy with respect to the redemptions revolves around 
the meaning of section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(see discussion infra). (California Physicians' Service v. 
Garrison, 28 Ca1.2d 790 [172 P.2d 4, 167 A.L.R. 306].) 
[3] Furthermore, as against a general demurrer the com-
plaint may be construed as an application for mandate. (Boren 
v. State Personnel Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 [234 P.2d 981].) 
It was error therefore to sustain the demurrers, and the 
judgments must be reversed. (Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. & 
Loan Soc., supra.) 
Our decision that controversies are shown to exist, how-
ever, does not resolve them, and we must therefore pass upon 
the questions of law that must be decided to reach a final. 
determination of the case. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) 
Validity of the Custom Craft Judgment 
Plaintiffs contend that the clerk was without authority 
to issue a second alias summons without the return of the 
first alias summons or an affidavit that the first had been 
lost, that therefore the service upon Helen of the second 
alias summons did not subject her to the jurisdiction of the 
court, and that consequently the judgment against her and 
the subsequent execution sale are void. 
8 SALSBERY t1. RITTER [48 C.2d 
This contention was considered by the Appellate Depart-
ment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in re-
versing a judgment of nonsuit in an unlawful detainer action 
brought by Ritter against the Salsberys. (Ritter v. Salsbery, 
142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847, 853-854 [298 P.2d 166].) The 
court held that there was no error in serving the second 
alias summons, saying, ". . . there is nothing in section 408, 
Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits the issuance of 
an alias summons while a previously issued alias is outstand-
ing .... It ... provides, without further qualification or 
condition, that 'As many alias summonses as are necessary 
may be issued within such time' .... " In our opinion sec-
tion 408 alone does not provide a solution to the problem. 
Although it authorizes the issuance of several alias summonses, 
the question remains whether they may be issued concur-
rently or whether the preceding summons must be returned 
or lost before a new summons may issue. 
[4] Section 406 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
for the issuance of only one original summons for each 
county in which one of the defendants resides. Section 408 
provides that an alias may issue only when the original has 
been returned or lost. Reading these sections together we 
conclude that there is to be outstanding in a single county 
only one summons at a time. This conclusion . finds further 
support in the fact that at common law it was thought that 
the return of the preceding writ was a prerequisite to the 
issuance of an alias or pluries writ. (See Alderson on Ju-
dicial Writs and Process (1895), pp. 154-157.) 
[5] The question then arises whether the irregularity in 
process of which plaintiffs complain is a sufficient reason 
to annul the subsequent judgment when the attack comes 
in an independent suit in equity more than a year after the 
entry of judgment and plaintiffs do not allege that they 
had a meritorious defense to the original action. The answer 
is that it is not. Even at common law failure to return the 
preceding writ did not render the alias or pluries writ void. 
(Alderson, supra, at 155-156.) In Williams' Administrator 
v. Welton's Administrator, 28 Ohio St. 451, under statutes 
very similar to our own, it was held that service of a second 
alias summons while the first was still outstanding gave the 
court jnrisdiction over the person. The court said at page 
471: "The object of a summons is to give the party notice, 
and as each of these writs was in due form, one was as 
effectual, as a notice, as the other to the party served." We 
Feb. 1957] SALSBERY tt. RITTER 
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agree with this statement and hold, therefore, that the Custom 
Craft judgment is not void. 
The Purported Redemptions 
Plaintiffs advance several arguments in support of their 
contention that Ritter and Holland never effectively redeemed. 
[6a] They urge that since the Ritter-Holland judgment was 
not obtained until after the sale of the property on execu-
tion, Ritter and Holland acquired no lien and were not 
eligible to redeem the property. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 701.) 
This contention is without merit. (Clark v. Cuin, 46 Ca1.2d 
3S6 [295 P.2d 401] ; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 412-
413 [70 Am.Dec. 655].) [7] Plaintiffs also contend that 
since they homesteaded the property prior to the Ritter-
Holland redemption, the redemption was invalid as a forced 
sale of exempt property. (See Civ. Code, § 1240.) This ar-
gumeut is likewise without merit, for even were we to hold 
that a redemption is equivalent to a forced sale, section 1241 
of the Civil Code provides that the homestead is subject to 
sale in satisfaction of a judgment that constituted a lien 
upon the premises before the declaration of homestead was 
filed for record. Such is the fact in this case. The homestead 
was not declared until April 21, 1955. [6b] The Ritter-
Holland judgment was recorded June 25, 1954, and under 
the rule of Clark v. Cuin, supra, at that time the Ritter-
Holland judgment became a lien upon the interest plaintiffs 
retained in the realty. 
Plaintiffs urge that even if Ritter and Holland validly 
redeemed, the $61.80 deposited by plaintiffs with the sheriff 
was sufficient to effect a redemption by the plaintiffs. Section 
703 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs redemption from 
Ii prior redemptioner. It provides in part: "If the judgment 
debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are 
required to effect a redemption by a redemptioner. "8 
What payments must a redemptioner make f The section 
provides: 
"If property be so redeemed by a redemptioner, another 
redemptioner may, within sixty days after the last redemp-
tioll, again redeem it from the last redemptioner on paying 
the sum paid on such last redemption, ... and, in addition, 
the amount of any liens held by such redemptioner prior to 
'Section 701, which lists the classes of persons eligible to redeem, 
makes a distinction bepwecn the judgment debtor or his successor and 
•• redemptioners." This distinction is maintained with variable eon-
sistency throughout sections 702 and 703. 
-
) 
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his own with interest; but the judgment under which the 
property was sold need not be so paid as a lien." 
.Ai! plaintiffs read the statute, "liens ... prior to his own" 
means liens held by the prior redemptioner that are prior 
to the lien created by the judgment that the prior redemp-
tioner personally recovered against the debtor, i.e., "his own." 
They argue that since only liens prior to "his own" must 
be paid, "his own" judgment lien need not be paid. The 
contrary argument is, of course, that "liens ... prior to 
his own" means liens prior to that upon which the current 
redemptioner seeks to redeem. 
Lawler v. Gleason, 130 Cal.App.2d 390, 397-400 [279 P.2d 
70], is cited as authority contrary to the construction ad-
vanced by plaintiffs. In that case, however, the prior re-
demptioner held in addition to "his own" judgment lien a 
lien "prior to his own," and the ambiguity pointed out here 
was not discussed. 
[8] It is clear that the statutory words "such redemp-
tioner" refer to the words "last redemptioner" (see original 
phraseology, Stats. 1851, ch. 5, p. 88, § 232), and it is equally 
clear that the words "last redemptioner" refer not to the 
current redemptioner but to the prior redemptioner. As thus 
interpreted the pertinent part of the section would read, 
" ... and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by the 
prior redemptioner prior to his own. . .. " The juxtaposi-
tion of the words "such redemptioner," meaning prior re-
demptioner, and the phrase "prior to his own" without in-
tervening punctuation would seem to indicate that the phrase 
"liens ... prior to his own" means liens held by the prior 
redemptioner that are prior to the lien created by the judg-
ment that the prior redemptioner personally recovered against 
the debtor. The purpose for which the statute was apparently 
enacted, however, and the language found in section 702 of 
the same code, relating to redemption from the execution sale 
purchaser, indicate that "liens ... prior to his own" means 
liens prior to the lien upon which the current redemptioner 
seeks to redeem. 
Chancellor Kent discussed the development of the right to 
redeem from sale upon execution in his monumental "Com-
mentaries." (14th ed., vol. 4, pp. 493-515.) He recounts 
that at common Jaw, real property was not subject to execu-
tion, but that for the brnefit of English creditors, the Statute 
of 5 George II, ch. 7 was enacted in 1732, making real estate 
in the English colonies subject to execution. For a long 
P'eb.1957] SALSBERY tI. RI'M'I!lB 
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time it was the practice to sell the real estate absolutely, 
without possibility of redemption, but" ... sales of land on 
execution had been attended with so much oppressive specu-
lation upon the necessities of the debtor, ... " (p. 431) that 
sewral states enacted statutes providing for redemption. 
[9] It thus appears that one of the primary purposes of 
statutory redemption is to force the purchaser at the execu-
tion sale to bid the property in at a price approximating its 
fair value. (See 23 Mich.L.Rev. 825, 839-841.) This purpose 
is apparent in our statute from the provisions in sections 
702 and 703 that any deficiency between the purchase price 
at the sale and the amount of the lien upon which the prop-
erty was sold need not be paid upon a subsequent redemption. 
To effectuate its purpose the statute must be construed to 
encourage redemption and make the property answer for 
('xisting liens up to its fair value. Redemption would not be 
encouraged by a construction that would permit a subsequent 
lienor to re-redeem without paying to the prior redemptioner 
the amount of his judgment. Under such a construction the 
current redemptioner would take subject to the lien of the 
prior redemptioner. The prior redemptioner would then be 
entitled to levy execution upon the property, and the proc-
ess would begin anew. Such a result would be .absurd. 
[10] Section 702 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that upon redemption from the execution purchaser, the re-
demptioner must pay the purchase price and certain other 
items" ... and if the purchaser be also a creditor, having 
a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than. the judg-
ment under which said purchase was made, the amount of 
such lien with interest. . . ." (Italics added.) Here the 
meaning is clear. The liens that must be paid are those prior 
to that upon which the current redemptioner seeks to redeem, 
and the rule must be the same upon redemption from a prior 
redemptioner. 
Even so, plaintiffs contend that their tender was sufficient. 
They point out that while their $61.80 remained in the hands 
of the sheriff, the Ritter-Holland judgment was discharged 
in bankruptcy. This fact, they argue, made it unnecessary 
for them to tender the amount of that judgment. It should 
be noted in this respect that plaintiffs' pleading of the as-
serted discharge is somewhat faulty. [11] The allegation is 
that the petitiom; in ,bankruptcy were "filed," "discharging" 
the judgment. OlJHously, the mere filing of the petitions 
did not serve to discharge the judgment, but the deficiency 
) 
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could have been corrected by 11IIlfmdment. We have con-
cluded, however, that discharg,. fir the judgment would not 
reduce the amount required fOT rmlemption. 
[12] Since section 703 rcqu;,.IIH the payment of liens, not 
judgments, we are concerned wi f II nle effect upon the Ritter-
Holland lien of the discharge III llIlnkruptcy of the Ritter~ 
Holland judgment. Section 67[," of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that when Ii jlldl{lOcnt was Ii lien on real 
property owned by the bankr1lpt. prior to the time he was 
adjudged a bankrupt, the lien FIII/lins unaffected though the 
judgment be discharged in bn II II "11 ptcy. The Ritter-Holland 
judgment was recorded June 2[" 1 !/!,4. Plaintiffs did not file 
their petitions in bankruptcy 111" il .June 1, 1955. The Ritter-
Holland lien was therefore ullllffected by the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
Plaintiffs' principal argumf'}lt. I1gainst the efficacy of the 
Ritter-Holland redemption aml III tmpport of the sufficiency 
of their own tender is that RHf .. ,· and Holland did not file 
a notice of redemption with th" t~()lmty recorder as required 
by section 703 of the Code of Olvil Procedure. The pertinent 
part of section 703 reads: 
uWritten notice of redemptioll mnst be given to the sheriff 
and a duplicate filed with th(' l'(\l:order of the county, and 
if any taxes or assessments nl'l\ paid by the redemptioner, 
or if any sum for· fire insnrnllt"', maintenance, upkeep, or 
repair .. , is paid by the rrllt'lIlptioner, or if he has or 
acquires any lien other than 111111 upon which the redemption 
was made, notice thereof mUf4f ill like manner be given to 
the sheriff and filed with the ]'I,,·tH·tIer; and if such notice be 
not filed, the property may bc l'I'tl'~rmed without paying such 
tax, assessment, sum, or lien." 
[13] In Ritter v. Salsbery, ,wpra, 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 
at 850-852, it was held that 1\ notice need be filed for re-
cordation only if the redeml'f iOller, subsequent to his re-
demption, makes expenditurc!' for the items enumerated in 
the section or acquires anot1wl' lit'll. That interpretation of 
the section is erroneous. Se('1 i,'11 703 refers to two distinct 
notices, a notice of redempl it1l1 nud a notice of subsequent 
expenditures or after-acquiretl lil'lIs. Only the former notice 
is involved in this case. 
[14] The question then oris.'''; fiR to tIle effect of a redemp-
tioner's failure to file a not it' I' "I' rt'demption with the eounty 
recorder. Section 703 proyidt";: " ... if sueh notice be not 
filed, the propert~· may be )'I,,\t't'med without paying such 
) 
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tax, assessment, sum, or lien." Although a contrary argument 
might be made, the reference to "tax, assessment, sum or 
lien" indicates that the specified penalty pertains only to a 
failure to record a notice of subsequent expenditures or after-
acquired liens, not to a failure to record a notice of redemp-
tion. Resort must therefore be had to the reasons underlying 
the requirement that a notice of redemption be recorded. 
[15] One reason may be deduced from the fact that re-
demption may be effected by paying the requisite amount 
either to the officer who sold the property or directly to the 
purchaser or prior redemptioner. (Code Civ. Proc., § 704.) 
Recordation of a notice of redemption diminishes the pos-
sibility that a subsequent redemptioner will make payment 
to some person who because of an undisclosed intervening 
redemption no longer has any interest in the property. 
Another reason is that persons eligible to re-redeem are 
entitled to know the amount of money required to effect a 
rfdemption so that they may act intelligently with respect 
to the property. (See Corporation of America v. Eustace, 
217 Cal. 102, 107 [17 P.2d 723]; see also Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 705.) The Legislature has provided that notice of subse-
quent expenditures and after-acquired liens must be recorded 
and, failing that, that their repayment may not be demanded 
as a prerequisite to redemption. (Code Civ. Proc., § 703.) 
To know the amount required for redemption, however, one 
must know not only the amount of subsequent expenditures 
but also the amount of the lien upon which the prior re-
demption was made, since the amount of that lien must be 
paid to effect a redemption. The recordation of a notice of 
redemption gives notice of the amount of that lien. 
[16] The effect of a failure to record would seem to de-
pend upon the events following the omission. For m,.tance, 
if no person sought to re-redeem within the statutory period, 
the failure to record would have no effect at all. If as a 
consequence of the failure to record, a subsequent redemp-
tioner should, without notice, pay the wrong person, the good 
faith redemption would be effective as against the faulty one. 
[17] When a person eligible to redeem, without notice of 
any intervening redemption, tenders to the sheriff or the last 
redemptioner of record a sum of money, which but for the 
lien of the undisclosed redemptioner would be sufficient to 
effect a redemption, that tender is sufficient unless the person 
seeking to redeem/is notified of the pertinent facts by the 
sheriff or the laSt redemptioner of record, and the inter-
') 
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vening redemptioner who has failed to record is precluded 
from demanding as a prerequisite to redemption from him 
the amount of his lien. This result gives effect to the purpose 
for which recording is required and parallels the result dic-
tated by section 703 when the omission is the failure to record 
a notice of subsequent expenditures or after-acquired liens. 
In view of the legislatiw ]"rqnirrmrnt that persons eligible 
to redeem be informed of the amount of money necessary 
to redeem, it is immaterial that the innocent subsequent re-
demptioner can reclaim his money. 
[18J The pleadings in the instant case do not disclose 
whether or not plaintiffs had actual notice of the Ritter-
Holland redemption when they tendered their $61.80 to the 
sheriff. Of course they must show that they had no such 
notice before they will be entitled toa favorable declaration, 
and technically they should have pleaded that fact. It appears 
from the foregoing discussion, however, that even without 
that allegation plaintiffs stated a case for a declaration of 
the meaning of the statute. 
Since it does not appear from plaintiffs' pleadings that 
any controversy exists between plaintiffs and the Municipal 
Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District or George J. 
Barbour, its clerk, or that plaintiffs are entItled to any relief 
against those defendants, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed 
as to them. As regards the other defendants, both judgments 
of dismissal are reversed for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. Plaintiffs shall bear their own costs on 
appeal and the costs on appeal of the Municipal Court of 
the Los Angeles Judicial District, of George J. Barbour, its 
clerk, and of defendants Custom Craft Sheet Metal Products, 
Jango Nishemine, George A. Cutright, and Stanley Sevilla. 
Each of' the other parties shall bear his own costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
